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Bayesian Decision Making around Experts

In Bayesian multi-armed bandits, pretraining on expert data tightens regret bounds by mutual information with the optimal action, while an information-directed rule selects data sources maximizing immediate information gain, and trust inference safeguards against ineffective or compromised experts.

Daniel Jarne Ornia, Joel Dyer, Nicholas Bishop, Anisoara Calinescu, Michael Wooldridge

Published 2026Sydney Poster Session 2 · Tue, Dec 8, 5:00 PM–8:00 PM local time · Hall 1-4arXiv ↗OpenReview ↗

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Abstract

Complex learning agents are increasingly deployed alongside existing experts, such as human operators or previously trained agents. However, it remains unclear how should learners optimally incorporate certain forms of expert data, which may differ in structure from the learner's own action-outcome experiences. We study this problem in the context of Bayesian multi-armed bandits, considering: (i) offline settings, where the learner receives a dataset of outcomes from the expert's optimal policy before interaction, and (ii) simultaneous settings, where the learner must choose at each step whether to update its beliefs based on its own experience, or based on the outcome simultaneously achieved by an expert. We formalize how expert data influences the learner's posterior, and prove that pretraining on expert outcomes tightens information-theoretic regret bounds by the mutual information between the expert data and the optimal action. For the simultaneous setting, we propose an information-directed rule where the learner processes the data source that maximizes their one-step information gain about the optimal action. Finally, we propose strategies for how the learner can infer when to trust the expert and when not to, safeguarding the learner for the cases where the expert is ineffective or compromised. By quantifying the value of expert data, our framework provides practical, information-theoretic algorithms for agents to intelligently decide when to learn from others.