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Steering Externalities: Benign Activation Steering Unintentionally Increases Jailbreak Risk for Large Language Models

Benign activation steering vectors inadvertently multiply jailbreak risks by eroding safety guardrails and raising attack success rates above 80%.

Chen Xiong, Zhiyuan HE, Pin-Yu Chen, Ching-Yun Ko, Tsung-Yi Ho

Published 2026Sydney Poster Session 1 · Tue, Dec 8, 10:00 AM–1:00 PM local time · Hall 1-4arXiv ↗OpenReview ↗

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AI panel13/20reviewers recommend it
lenient 5/5
medium 7/10
strict 1/5
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Panel consensus
Benign activation steering can multiply jailbreak success past 80% by eroding safety margins, though critics want systematic ablations to confirm the vector, not format compliance or base alignment, is the true force multiplier.

Abstract

Activation steering is a practical post-training model alignment technique to enhance the utility of Large Language Models (LLMs). Prior to deploying a model as a service, developers can steer a pre-trained model toward specific behavioral objectives, such as compliance or instruction adherence, without the need for retraining. This process is as simple as adding a steering vector to the model's internal representations. However, this capability unintentionally introduces critical and under-explored safety risks. We identify a phenomenon termed Steering Externalities, where steering vectors derived from entirely benign datasets-such as those enforcing strict compliance or specific output formats like JSON-inadvertently erode safety guardrails. Experiments reveal that these interventions act as a force multiplier, creating new vulnerabilities to jailbreaks and increasing attack success rates to over 80% on standard benchmarks by bypassing the initial safety alignment. Ultimately, our results expose a critical blind spot in deployment: benign activation steering systematically erodes the "safety margin," rendering models more vulnerable to black-box attacks and proving that inference-time utility improvements must be rigorously audited for unintended safety externalities.